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Abstract 
The use of public debt is not new in financing developmental objectives. A significant challenge arose when it 
became obvious that the indebted countries could not fulfill its existing financial obligation to the rest of the world 
where debt is sourced. For a panel of 4 heterogeneous countries from 1990 to 2017, we study governments’ reactions 
to debt accumulation and the corrective measures taken when its borrowings result in a rise in debt–GDP ratio. The 
study evidence is based on the fixed effect and the feasible generalized least squares estimators. We find evidence 
that primary balance improves by about 0.005–0.013 for every 1 percentage point increase in central government 
debt after controlling for other relevant factors. The results further suggest that the accrued interest payments on 
debt reflect the effective debt management policies across the countries, whereas the activities on the current 
account balance impose a possible threat to the primary balance. The study calls for policies that increase fiscal bases 
through the reduction in fiscal expenditure and the reinforcement of tax base revenue across the MIST countries.
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permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copyright holder. To view a copy of this licence, visit http://creat iveco 
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Introduction
Investment opportunities in Mexico, Indonesia, South 
Korea, and Turkey (henceforth MIST countries) in the 
last decade have become more attractive based on expec-
tations for high growth due to their favorable demo-
graphics and fast-paced economies. However, there are 
many concerns that excessive practice of fiscal deficit or 
heavy reliance on debt may have adverse effects on the 
economic progress in many ways [19, 41, 42]. One pri-
mary concern for debt sustainability in MIST countries 
is the growth in a debt burden that is likely to result in a 
disparity between interest and exchange rate with a nega-
tive attendant to expected inflation which might result 
in a liquidity trap and economic hardship. The second 
concern is the possibility that MIST countries might be 
exposed to exogenous shock due to high private indebt-
edness which has weighed on its economic outlook in 
recent times. Hence, in this study, it becomes important 
to analyze debt sustainability among MIST countries 
because proper debt management is a critical ingredient 
for a stable economy.
Debt sustainability is widely acknowledged as the ability 
of a country to meet its financial obligation without being 
subject to the external rescue [36]. IMF [27] describes 
debt sustainability as the need to satisfy solvency condi-
tion without subject to correction or additional cost of 
financing. To further highlight the importance of debt 
sustainability, some studies claimed that such solvency 
condition must ensure that public debt plus the discount 
value of entirely government spending does not exceed 
the present value of generated revenues of non-interest 
spending [14, 32].
Public debt is an important instrument used by sover-
eign governments to manage their fiscal imbalance that 
arises out of mismatches between revenue generation 
and expenditure needs [29]. Due to the large fiscal imbal-
ance faced by most countries, the government resorts to 
an external source of revenue in the form of borrowing to 
augment its internal revenue. While this practice in itself 
is not bad, an excess accumulation of debt creates serious 
fiscal problem for both current and future generations if 
not properly managed [4, 18]. This is because misman-
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impact on the gross domestic product (GDP) thereby 
increasing the debt-to-GDP ratio and draining out gov-
ernment revenue via debt servicing and interest payment. 
On the other hand, when debt is properly managed for 
the purpose to which it was borrowed, it boosts the GDP 
and reduces the debt-to-GDP ratio.
The obvious question is whether the current macro-
economic policies in MIST countries can avert financial 
crises which question the essence of revisiting its level 
of public debt accumulation. This further questions the 
importance of macroeconomic policy and the effective-
ness of debt management in reducing fluctuation that is 
expected should in case the financial obligation cannot 
be met [33, 50]. In addition, the present inconsistency 
observed in the external asset and liability of the MIST 
countries shows the possibility that setbacks in growth 
are expected. Thus, earlier signals to prevent the occur-
rence call for the need to address the MIST debt sustain-
ability problem. Some studies have claimed that poor 
supervision of the financial institution coupled with 
lack of fiscal discipline is a new channel through which 
public debt can become a dilemma, especially when the 
gap between the rich and the poor becomes obvious [20, 
25, 45]. It became more serious when the people cannot 
guarantee the safety of funds, due to expected financial 
crises.
Many theoretical papers have claimed that debt sus-
tainability is not only explained by the threshold in the 
level of debt-to-GDP ratio, but the ability of a country to 
fulfill is debt obligation [28, 37]. The group of theoreti-
cal papers claims would argue that grave concern is more 
when the foreign currency is preferred to a domestic cur-
rency which often leads to financial crises. Besides, the 
vast majority of studies have suggested that the source 
of government financing does not matter, but the spend-
ing structure should be significant attention [4, 18], but 
this study undermines the possibility that unsustainable 
of debt can have a varied consequence on investment, 
consumption, and output level. Thus, it would appear this 
suggestion took for granted the option that public debt 
can have a different effect on the economy both internally 
and externally.
In the earlier empirical literature, studies by Hamilton 
and Flavin [24], Wilcox [48], Trehan and Walsh [44], and 
Bohn [11] examine fiscal debt sustainability through the 
use of nonstationary time series analysis. Hamilton and 
Flavin [24] focus on the stochastic properties of the defi-
cit inclusive-of-interest payments and found that fiscal 
policy is sustainable. In contrast with their result, Wilcox 
48 by allowing for stochastic real interest rates found that 
the US fiscal policy has not been sustainable in the scope 
of its study. Trehan and Walsh [44] show that in study-
ing government expenditure and financing decisions, 
intertemporal budget balance can be imposed easily by 
estimating a vector error correction model that includes 
the inclusive-of-interest deficit as the error correction 
term. Bohn [11] showed that sustainability is compatible 
with any order of integration of the variables involved.
Bohn [9, 10] proposed a different test on sustainabil-
ity. It states that public debt policy is sustainable if the 
primary surplus–GDP ratio is a positive function of the 
debt–GDP ratio. The plausible economic intuition is that 
if government run into debt, they have to take corrective 
actions on the future by increasing the primary surplus 
in order for public debt to be sustainable [6]. Specifically, 
Bohn [10] has suggested that the deciding fiscal policy 
soundness should not be restricted to the evaluation of 
stationarity of the debt-to-GDP ratio and provides a 
new sustainability test that does not require interest rate 
assumptions. More recently, Fournier and Fall [21] and 
Ghosh et al. [22, 23] have used fiscal reaction functions 
for the estimation of public debt sustainability thresh-
olds and public debt limits aimed at providing possible 
measures of fiscal space. Also, Checherita-Westphal and 
Ždárek [16]) propose to use fiscal reaction functions to 
derive primary balance benchmarks used to identify fis-
cal fatigue risks. Their result shows that after control-
ling for relevant factors, primary balance improves in the 
euro area by about 0.03–0.05 for every 1 percentage point 
increase in the debt-to-GDP ratio.
Earlier evidence failed to account for the possibility of 
the role of current account management and business 
cycles play in public debt sustainability.1 The few consen-
suses rely deeply on the disparities in debt-to-GDP ratio 
and solvency transmission mechanism [39]. In this paper, 
we study governments’ reactions to the accumulation of 
debt, taking into account the crucial role of the current 
account balances. Also, we look at whether the govern-
ment takes corrective measures when the debt–GDP 
ratio starts rising or just let the debt grow, knowing fully 
well of its consequences for public debt (non)sustain-
ability. With this purpose, for a panel of four countries 
from 1990 to 2017, we investigate the existence of a sys-
tematic relationship between debt and primary balance 
series. We claimed that the ability of these countries to 
meet their financial obligations is not the only contribu-
tory factor to their economic misfortune. We argue that 
MIST countries share similar consequences of focusing 
on inflation targeting which does not reassure stability 
nor help reduce their debt vulnerability. We further claim 
that excessive debt accumulation in MIST countries is the 
1 See Tanner and Samake [43], Islam and Biswas [26], Makin [35], Ahmed [2], 
Mahmood and Rauf [34], Kaur et al. [31], Agnello and Sousa [1], and Renjith 
and Shanmugam [40].
Page 3 of 8Ogbeifun and Shobande  Futur Bus J 2020, 6(1):33
consequence of credit rationing which are erosion from 
the capital market and spillover from external shock.
Methods
Model and data
To set up the framework for this study, we begin by 
stating the budget equation which shows the rela-
tion between public debt, Dt , and primary balance, St : 
Dt+1 = (Dt − St)(1+ Rt+1) , where Rt is the nominal 
interest rate and 1 + Rt+1 is the gross interest factor. Con-
sidering a growing economy with growing government 
expenditure and growing tax base, the evolution of the 
budget equation in terms of debt-to-GDP ratio is
which can be simplified as
where Yt is the actual GDP, dt = DtYt  is the ratio of general 
government debt to GDP, st = StYt  denote primary balance 
to GDP ratio, and (1+ Rt+1) ≈ 1+ rt+1 − yt+1 denotes 
the ratio of gross return on government debt to the gross 
growth rate of GDP. The variables yt+1 and rt+1 denote the 
real growth rate and the real interest rate, respectively.
To complement the theoretical approach of Blanchard 
et  al. [8] and other more complex sustainability frame-
works, Bohn [10] provided a new test of sustainable fiscal 
policy by relating the primary balance to the level of debt, 
with or without conditioning on further controls. This is 
written as:
where pbt is the primary balance as a percentage of GDP, 
dt is the government debt-to-GDP ratio, θ measures the 
responsiveness of the primary balance to the debt ratio, 
and ξt contains other determinants of primary balance 
and the error term.
For an economy to satisfy its intertemporal budget con-
straint and the so-called no-Ponzi condition, the coeffi-
cient θ > 0 is sufficient provided the present value of GDP 
is finite and ξt < ∞ as a fraction of GDP as well.2 How-
ever, other studies3 have shown that a positive coefficient 
θ cannot be viewed as a sufficient condition to achieve 
fiscal sustainability, especially if there is a limit for posi-
tive values of primary balance, for instance, at a very 















(2)dt+1 = [dt − st ]xt+1
(3)pbt = αt + [θ ∗ dt ]+ ξt
accounted for. In such situations, the Bohn’s condition is 
a “weak sustainability condition.”4
The empirical model for this study is an extension of 
the relationship given in Eq. (3):
where pbi,t is the primary balance as a share of GDP 
and pbi,t−1 is its one year lagged value which deter-
mines the interest payment in the current period, di,t−1 
is the 1 year lagged debt-to-GDP ratio, Xi,t is a vector of 
macro(economic) and political determinants of the pri-
mary balance, γi are country fixed effect included to cap-
ture all other time-invariant country-specific factors that 
are not explicitly controlled for and t are time dummies; 
the error term, ∈i,t , captures measurement errors and 
random shocks.
In the fiscal reaction function (FRF) literature, two 
main policy variables—the cyclically adjusted primary 
balance (CAPB) or the primary balance (PB)—have been 
used as a dependent variable.5 Following most studies, 
we prefer to use PB as the dependent variable since it is 
the “observable” fiscal policy that is less prone to ex-post 
revisions (due to output gap and elasticity’s’ uncertainty).6
In choosing determinants of the fiscal position, we fol-
low the work of Baig and Abiad [5]. In their study, these 
determinants are divided into three main groups: (1) 
optimizing agent, (2) political economy consideration, 
and (3) institutional factors that shape the policy envi-
ronment and the use of fiscal measures. The “Base” FRF 
model includes the lagged of debt-to-GDP ratio—that is 
central government debt (CGD)—and 1  year lagged of 
primary balance as the independent variable, and as for 
the determinants of primary balance, we use interest pay-
ment on the public debt (INTP), current account balance 
(CAB), business cycle variable (YVAR), and Election year 
dummy (EY).7 The main data source for our analysis is 
the World Development Indicators (WDI, [49]) and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF).
(4)
pbi,t = α + δ ∗ pbi,t−1 + [θ ∗ di,t−1]
+ [β ∗ Xi,t ]+ γi + t+ ∈i,t .
2 See Bohn [12].
3 See Daniel and Shiamptanis [17] and Ghosh et al. [22, 23].
4 Ghosh et al. [22, 23].
5 As defined by the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Devel-
opment (OECD), primary balance is overall balance excluding net inter-
est payment (interest expenditure minus interest revenue), while cyclically 
adjusted primary balance is the difference between the cyclical component 
of the overall fiscal balance—computed as the difference between cyclical 
revenues and cyclical expenditures—and the automatic stabilizers, exclud-
ing net interest payment.
6 See Checherita-Westphal and Ždárek [16].
7 Current account balance (CAB) to control for cross-country spillovers 
and the hypothesis of twin deficits, and Election year dummy (EY) account 
for political risk variable. YVAR is obtained by applying the HP Filter twice 
on GDP series (see [3].
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Empirical methodology
The study applies Pesaran [38] unit root test to ascer-
tain the order of integration of the variables in the model 
since it tolerates cross-sectional dependence. To provide 
evidence in favor of the cointegration hypothesis, we 
apply the Pedroni residual-based cointegration test and 
the Westerlund [46] tests on cointegration. Finally, the 
model is estimated using the fixed effect (FE) estimator 
allowing for the presence of potentially endogenous vari-
ables. Being aware of criticisms of its use, we argue that 
our panel is medium to large in the time dimension com-
pared to the cross-sectional dimension and the potential 
bias should be limited—the “rule of thumb” based on 
Bond [13] states that for cases when T is larger than 20, 
the potential bias of the FE estimator should be negligi-
ble.8 We use the feasible GLS (FGLS) to correct for any 




Table  1 reports the summary statistics to the variables 
relevant for the analysis presented here. The average 
value and related deviation of the primary balance (PB) 
stood at 1.45 (1.73), while for the central government 
debt (CGD) 31.69 (14.50), interest payment (INTP) 3.73 
(4.47), current account balance (CAB) − 4.16 (27.82), and 
the business cycle variable (YVAR) − 0.003 (0.124).
Correlation analysis
The correlation results presented in Table  2 show that 
multicollinearity is not a problem in this study. This is 
because all the regressors are not strongly correlated. 
The central government debt, interest payment, and 
current account balance are positively correlated with 
primary balance at 18.7%, 27.7%, and about 0.9%, respec-
tively, while the business cycle variable has a negative 
correlation with primary balance at 3.5%. Going by this 
result, we proceed with the other estimations.
Cross‑sectional dependence (CD) test
The cross-sectional dependence (CD) tests displayed in 
Table 3 indicates a strong CD among the countries. The 
Frees test, Pesaran CD test, Friedman test, and Breusch–
Pagan LM test are all significant at a 1% significance level. 
Hence, we reject the null hypothesis of no cross-sectional 
dependence and confirm that there is strong dependence 
among the 4 countries selected. The economic implica-
tion is that government debt policies adopted by any of 
the MIST countries have transboundary impacts on the 
other countries.
Panel unit root test and cointegration test
With the presence of CD, the first generation panel unit 
root becomes inadequate; hence, we use the second gen-
eration panel unit root test of Pesaran [38] in Table 4. The 
results show that PB, CGD, and YVAR are I(1) stationary 
at the 1% significance level after first difference, whereas 
INTP and CAB are I(0) stationary at a 1% significance 
level. The values of the statistics in Table 5 suggest that 
we can reject the null hypothesis of no cointegration at 
the 5% level for both tests.
Table 1 Summary statistics of  the  variables considered 





CAB − 4.156 27.822
YVAR − 0.003 0.124
Table 2 Correlation of  variables. Source: Authors’ 
computation (2020)
PB CGD INTP CAB YVAR
PB 1.0000
CGD 0.1879 1.0000
INTP 0.2770 0.4273 1.0000
CAB 0.0089 0.1100 − 0.1396 1.0000
YVAR − 0.0353 − 0.3816 − 0.1808 − 0.2008 1.0000




Null hypothesis: there is no CD among selected countries
Frees test 0.8760***
Frees’ Q distribution 0.0924 10%
0.1204 5%
0.1726 1%
Pesaran CD test 5.462*** 0.0000
Friedman test 64.818*** 0.0000
Breusch–Pagan LM 38.194*** 0.0000
8 It has been shown that GMM estimators would not alleviate the problem. 
See Judson and Owen [30] and Celasun and Kang [15].
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Baseline estimate and extended models
The results from the fixed effect (FE) regression are 
reported in Table 6. The choice of the fixed effect model 
over the random effect model is justified by the Hausman 
test results. The Base model in column [1] is estimated 
without a time fixed effect. The estimated FRF coefficient 
of interest—the response to government debt (CGD)—is 
positive and statistically significant and amount to 0.019. 
The explanatory power as measured by the goodness of 
fit statistics is 0.525. In column [2], including the time 
fixed effect in the Base model improves the explanatory 
power. The FRF coefficient is slightly lower and remains 
statistically significant.
Table 4 Pesaran [38] panel unit root test Source: Authors’ computation (2020)
***1% significance level
Variables CIPS stat. level P value CIPS stat. first diff P value Order 
of integration
PB − 1.615 0.053 − 5.314 0.000*** I(1)
CGD 0.214 0.585 − 4.143 0.000*** I(1)
INTP − 3.336 0.000*** – – I(0)
YVAR 1.115 0.868 − 4.111 0.000*** I(1)
CAB − 4.290 0.000*** – – I(0)
Table 5 Panel cointegration test. Source: Authors’ 
computation (2020)
**5% significance level
Pedroni test Westerlund test








Table 6 Basic model and extended specifications, fixed effect. Source: Authors’ computation (2020)
italic values denote main variable of interest
***, **, *1%, 5% and 10% significance level; [] = p value
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8









































































R2 0.525 0.748 0.540 0.530 0.530 0.526 0.552 0.757
No. of observation 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
Hausman [0.004] [0.017] [0.043] [0.012] [0.049] [0.041] [0.033] [0.037]
Diagnostic test
B-P LM [0.049] [0.049] [0.117] [0.072] [0.050] [0.039] [0.239] [0.289]
CD test [0.001] [0.001] [0.002] [0.001] [0.001] [0.000] [0.004] [0.002]
M-Wald test [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
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Following a stepwise approach, we add other variables 
to the Base model in columns [3]–[4] and noticed a slight 
improvement in the explanatory power. The FRF coeffi-
cients range between 0.015 and 0.023 and remain highly 
significant. The coefficients of interest payment (INTP) 
and election year (EY) are both positive and statistically 
significant, whereas the coefficient of the current account 
balance (CAB) is negative and not statistically significant. 
Similarly, the coefficient of the business cycle variable—
which captures the output gap—is generally positive and 
insignificant. This result is similar to other recent stud-
ies, such as Berti et al. [7] and Checherita-Westphal and 
Ždárek [16]. Columns [7] and [8] show results for models 
with all the variables, with and without time fixed effect. 
The FRF coefficient and the explanatory power only 
improve by a small margin.
The diagnostic test suggests the problem of cross-
sectional dependence and heteroscedasticity. To correct 
these problems, Wiggins and Poi [47] suggest the feasi-
ble GLS (FGLS). Table 6 shows the results from the FGLS 
estimates. Across all columns, the FRF coefficients are 
slightly lower than the counterpart in Table  7; however, 
they remain positive and statistically significant, which 
implies that an increase in the central government debt 
will bring about an increase in primary balance. The eco-
nomic intuition is that in the long run, the government 
fiscal policy is sustainable in the MIST countries. This 
result is a strong signal for investors and borrowers about 
the economic performance in the MIST countries, which 
further smoothens the economic confidence among vari-
ous players in the economic space. We find strong evi-
dence for interest payment (INTP) which highlights the 
debt management strategy implemented across the MIST 
countries and suggest a sign of relief for the current and 
future generations from unnecessary tax burden from the 
government. While the business cycle variable (YVAR) 
has a positive impact on the primary balance, the current 
account balance (CAB) has a negative impact on primary 
balance although both variables are found not to be sig-
nificant. This is not surprising as the data show that in 
most part of the period covered by this study, the current 
account balance is usually deficit for most of the MIST 
countries. This reduces the revenue side of the primary 
balance account, and with the expenditure side on the 
rise, the net primary balance is expected to fall—ceteris 
paribus. 
“Appendix” includes a robustness check (in Table  8) 
with respect to the choice of the dependent variable—
cyclically adjusted primary balance (CABP) instead of 
primary balance (PB). The results are quite similar to 
those using PB, but the coefficients of the government 
debt, which range from 0.001 to 0.008, are lower com-
pared to those in Table 7. This further justifies our choice 
for the primary balance, as the FRF coefficients from the 
cyclically adjusted primary balance might signal weak 
sustainability.
Table 7 Basic model and extended specifications, feasible GLS Source: Authors’ computation (2020)
italic values denote main variable of interest
***, **,*1%, 5% and 10% significance level; [] = p value
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8









































































No. of observation 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
Diagnostic test
M-Wald test [0.064] [0.159] [0.110] [0.650] [0.522] [0.116] [0.220] [0.882]
Page 7 of 8Ogbeifun and Shobande  Futur Bus J 2020, 6(1):33
Conclusion
In this article, we examined the relationship between 
public debt and primary balance in MIST countries. 
Using a panel dataset from 1990 through 2017, we 
explore if the fiscal policy follows a sustainable path. 
Having controlled for the problem of cross-sectional 
dependence and heteroscedasticity, we found evidence 
that fiscal policy is sustainable. The primary balance 
improves by about 0.005–0.013 for every 1 percentage 
point increase in central government debt. As regards 
other determinants, the interest payment result is a 
huge relief for taxpayers as it reassures them that the 
governments are on the right path in its debt manage-
ment practices. The political factor variable—election 
year—has a strong impact on the primary balance. A 
possible interpretation is that projects embarked on 
and the policies announced by the political candidates 
are mostly followed up, as the data reflect significant 
increases in the primary balances after election year 
across the countries.
In conclusion, a possible suggestion to ensure the MIST 
countries continue to enjoy sustainable fiscal policy in 
the future is to increase their fiscal bases through the 
reduction in fiscal expenditures and the reinforcement of 
tax revenue bases which will help correct for the recur-
rent deficit in the current account balance and create a 
favorable debt–GDP ratio.
Abbreviations
MIST: Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, and Turkey; CGD: central government 
debt to GDP; INTP: interest payment on public debt; CAB: current account bal-
ance; YVAR: business cycle variable; CAPB: cyclically adjusted primary balance; 
FRF: fiscal reaction function; EY: election year; PB: primary balance; FE: fixed 




O.S. drafted the introduction and theoretical model used for the study. L.O. 
collected and analyzed the secondary, discussed the result and conclude the 
study. All authors have read and approved the manuscript.
Funding
No funding was obtained for this study.
Availability of data and materials
Datasets used and/or analyzed during the current study are available from the 
corresponding author on reasonable request.
Competing interest
The authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Author details
1 Department of Economics, University of Mississippi, Oxford, MS 38677, USA. 
2 Business School, University of Aberdeen, Block C, Edward Wright Annexes, 
Aberdeen AB 243 RX, UK. 
Appendix: Robustness check
See Table 8.
Table 8 Basic model and extended specifications with CAPB, feasible GLS. Source: Authors’ computation (2020)
italic values denote main variable of interest
***, **, *1%, 5% and 10% significance level; [] = p value
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8









































































No. of Observation 108 108 108 108 108 108 108 108
Country
FE
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time FE No Yes No Yes No No No Yes
Diagnostic test
M-Wald test [0.155] [0.069] [0.471] [0.226] [0.342] [0.212] [0.103] [0.214]
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